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Bringing the Messiah
Through the Law
Ruti Teitel

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) was convened in 1993 in The Hague to prosecute war
crimes committed in the course of the conflict in the Balkans.1 It
is the first international legal body authorized to adjudicate war

crimes since the court in Nuremberg about a half-century ago.
Although the tribunal in The Hague was consciously patterned
after Nuremberg, it was created in utterly distinct political circumstances. The trials after World War II represented "victors'
justice." They were conducted after peace had been achieved, and

they sought to give legal expression to the victors' outrage at Ger-

many's initiation of an unjust war.
The ICTY, by contrast, was convened in the midst of a bloody
conflict. Its mandate was not to shape the meaning of a peace that
had already been achieved, but instead to bring individuals responsible for atrocities to justice in an effort to establish peace.

The ICTY, therefore, prods us to investigate the connection
between international criminal justice and peace. The mandate
handed by international law to the ICTY - to impose justice before peace and as a means to achieve peace- has no precedent.
How can justice in a courtroom wrapped in tempered glass in The
Hague, isolated from a raging conflict on the ground in war-torn
Yugoslavia, contribute to peace?
In this essay, I shall explore the relationship between the messy
and political business of peacemaking and the assertion of law in a
distant and antiseptic vacuum. The essential mission of the ICTY
is to transform the conflict in the Balkans to one of individual
crimes answerable to the rule of law, and so to achieve peace and
reconciliation. But the efforts of the ICTY to accomplish this mission serve primarily to underscore the dependence of the rule of
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law on a supporting matrix of a national and international politics. Stripped of this matrix, deprived of political authority and
constituency, the transformative potential of the ICTY must rely
on the proffer of a thin and inadequate image of liberal identity.
Punishment, Truth, and Peace
The mission of the ICTY must be understood in the context of its

origins in the Balkans conflict. In the spring of 1992, Bosnian
Serbs, with the assistance of the Yugoslavia army, began a drive to
"ethnically cleanse" all non-Serb inhabitants from large stretches
of Bosnia. Their tactics included widespread and systematic persecution, torture, murder, rape, beatings, harassments, discrimination, and forced displacements. With the fall of the U.N. safe
havens of Srebrenica and Zepa in April and July 1995, Bosnian
Serb forces virtually completed the "ethnic cleansing" of eastern
Bosnia. It is estimated that their campaign of terror killed close to
a quarter of a million persons; it produced tens of thousands of
refugees.

tional peace and security." According to prevailing conventions
codified after the postwar period, the atrocities exposed in the
Balkans could be punished as war crimes.6 Bringing individuals to
justice, the Security Council said, would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of the peace.
The international community did not respond to the terrible
abuses in the Balkans by organizing military interventions forcefully to prevent further atrocities. It chose instead to create and

empower a tribunal capable of enforcing the rule of law. The
international community asserted that peace and proper governance could be restored to the region through the politics of
punishment.
Historically, however, justice has followed war. Postwar trials
have been used to establish the nature of an antecedent war, to
·
3
determine whether it had been an «, 'unjust'
or a «:'just' 3 war.37'T} 1e
Treaty of Versailles, for example, was an example of "victors' jus-

tice," avenging Germany's unjust war. And again, after World

destruction of civilian property, all in a campaign of "ethnic

War II, the Allies attempted to punish Germany for waging aggressive war. Unlike Nuremberg, however, the ICTY was no postwar tribunal. The ICTY would attempt to dispense justice before
peace and without the clarification of military victory. It would
therefore lack the authority and power of traditional victors' justice. The difference was plainly visible in the ICTY's frustrating
inability to seize custody of defendants or to command access to
evidence.
The difficulties of the ICTY were compounded by its double
mission. The tribunal was created not merely to dispense justice,
but also to achieve reconciliation in the region. It was explicitly

cleansing" to "render an area ethnically homogeneous using force

established by the Security Council as a "peacemaking" measure.

and intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the

No doubt this political mission was grafted onto the ICTY in part
to compensate for the glaring failure of the international commu-

Almost three years before, however, in the fall of 1992, the
U.N. Security Council had received reports of mass expulsion,
civilian deportations, mass killings, torture, imprisonment, and
atrocities in detention camps. 2 It therefore set up a commission to
investigate atrocities committed in the region. It was the first such
commission created since World War II, and it was modeled on
the 1943 Allied War Crimes Commission. By February 1993, the
"Commission of Experts" had concluded that there had been
willful killing, organized massacres, torture, rape, pillage, and

4

area." In eastern Bosnia, ethnic cleansing appeared to constitute
part of a much larger attempt by Bosnian Serb forces to commit
genocide against Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serbs.5
By early spring 1993, the United Nations was confronted with
the question of how to respond. Though ethnic cleansing and
other violations of humanitarian law in the Balkans were declared
to threaten "international peace and security," allied humanitarian intervention was not marshaled to stop the atrocities. Instead,
operating under its Chapter 7 powers, the Security Council established the ICTY as "a measure to maintain or restore interna-
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nity to take the political and military steps necessary to stop the
slaughter. But there are rather obvious tensions between cnmrnal
law and peacemaking.
So, for example, when the tribunal declared its intention to
indict Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko
Mladic, the indictments themselves appeared to endanger the
peace. Although the parties to the Dayton Peace Accords had

pledged full cooperation with the tribunal," and although the
accords obligated signatories to support the tribunal and to hand

TEITEL

179

over suspected war criminals, these obligations lacked explicit
enforcement mechanisms. 10 There was no unambiguous assignment of responsibility for the apprehension and arrest of indicted
war criminals, and in fact these powers were said to lie outside
the mandate of the NATO peace implementation force, the IFOR.
Tension caused by the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to honor persistent calls for the arrests of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic
has certainly proved a thorn in the side of the peace process.
The pivotal question posed by the ICTY, therefore, is how the
dispensation of international criminal justice can be joined to the
establishment of peace. Deterrence might be one such connection. Holding war crimes trials during conflict might be said
sometimes to deter crimes. French trials of German soldiers during World War I," and Allied threats of punishment issued during World War II, were both predicated on the notion that they
would discourage the commission of further atrocities.12 But the
prosecutions of the ICTY have been far too sparse and ineffectual
to hold much promise of actual deterrence, and indeed massacres
continued well after the tribunal's establishment.
The blunt and unpleasant fact is that the ICTY has been forced
to seek criminal punishment within a political vacuum. In contrast to the victors' justice confidently meted out at Nuremberg
over a vanquished enemy, the ICTY is fragile. Seated in the Netherlands, far from the Balkans, it lacks both custody over the
accused and control of the evidence necessary to establish individual wrongdoing. Most of those responsible for war crimes
remain at large.
More to the point, the ICTY is without the political resources
to remedy these gross inadequacies. In a speech to the United
Nations General Assembly, the tribunal's president, Antonio
Cassesse, compared the ICTY to "a giant who has no arms and no
legs. To walk and work, he needs artificial limbs. These artificial
limbs are the State authorities; without their help the Tribunal
can not operate.' Like Gulliver among the Lilliputians, the ICTY
has been paralyzed by the international community.
The ICTY has responded to these limitations by seeking justice
largely within the framework of judicial processes of inquiry and
indictment. Because the ICTY had sought to differentiate itself
from Nuremberg by forbidding trials and convictions in absentia,
the tribunal has to date been forced to focus on indicting those
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whom the ICTY is powerless to apprehend to stand trial. ICTY
indictments, so-called "superindictments," have consequently become elaborate proceedings, involving both recitation of offenses
and presentation of evidence. The proceedings are public and
even televised; Court TV covered the Karadzic and Mladic indict-

ments "live.' The proceedings offer the drama and testimony of
Ii ving witnesses.14 In outward form they are similar to trials in
absentia, although there can be no judgment in the absence of the
accused.15
kc "h
<I."This
These superindictment proceedings are like
'show trials.
is not because their results are foreordained, but because their
main purpose is to tell a story. It is largely through the proceedings of these public indictments that the ICTY establishes and
condemns wrongdoing. Following the indictments, an international warrant of arrest is issued, the evidence published, and the
accused publicly branded as an international fugitive from justice.
These indictments and the resulting stigmatization will often be
the tribunal's only sanction.
From this we may conclude that the ICTY's mission of achieving a peaceful reconciliation in the region is less dependent on

the actual infliction of punishment than on the use of superindictment proceedings to construct truthful narratives of past

abuses. It has almost become dogma in contemporary foreign
policy that establishing the "truth" about a state's repressive past
can lay the foundation for national reconciliation. National truth
commissions in Argentina, Chile, and South Africa have been
touted as prerequisite for successful political transitions. In advo-

cating the establishment of the ICTY, Madeline Albright asserted

before the U.N. Security Council that "the only victor that will
prevail in this endeavor will be the truth.

The promise of such a reconciliation-based-in-truth was symbolized by the ICTY's appointment of Chief Prosecutor Richard
Goldstone, known for his leadership in South Africa s peaceful

transition from apartheid. Indeed, at the first superindictment pro-

ceeding Goldstone likened public indictments to national truth
:±
d leclaring
la
h
he © put bl;tic..,,
record will assist in atcommissions,
that
the
tributing guilt to individuals and be an important tool in avoiding
.
.
·
"16
the attribution of collective guilt to any nation or ethmc group.
There can be no doubt that through its indictments the ICTY
has helped to make known the terrible atrocities perpetrated in
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the Balkans, and that public knowledge of these facts may well
have contributed toward shaping the peace. At Dayton, for example, ICTY indictments of Serbian leaders Radovan Karadzic and
General Ratko Mladic for genocide, murder, rape, and other
offenses significant I y affected resolution of the question of politi-

cal representation in the region. The peace accords banned in-

dicted war criminals from holding future political office.'
Nevertheless, there remains a rather large gap between these

may be endangered. The prime focus of a criminal proceeding is

to ascribe individual responsibility for past wrongdoing. This is
the foundation of the presumption of innocence, whose significance is that criminal judgments should not be used merely as a
means to other ends, even to the end of truth. Although indictments are not convictions, they do have important legal consequences, and it would be improper to use indictments in a merely
instrumental fashion.

contributions and the achievement of that reconciliation to which
Goldstone and the founders of the ICTY aspired. Even indicted
perpetrators of genocide remain free and continue to wield political power. Although Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic may
have been forced after his indictment to resign as head of his
political party, he does not seem also to have been deprived of his
considerable political influence.
ICTY indictments are thus not functionally equivalent to convictions and imprisonments. The difference emphasizes the distinction between institutions that seek to establish the truth after
a transfer of power and shift in regimes, as in South Africa, and
institutions like the ICTY that hope to use a new collective truth
as a basis to establish reconciliation. Ordinarily, official truth
investigations are convened to secure a peace that has already
been achieved through military and political means. Their narratives carry the full retrospective authority of victors' justice. But
the ICTY must attempt to uncover an historical "truth" so abstractly convincing as to be itself capable of establishing a peace.
In the absence of a Bosnian political constituency, it is not clear
what such a "truth" might be.
There is considerable tension, moreover, between the ICTY's
efforts to construct truthful narratives to achieve reconciliation
and the ICTY's fundamental obligation to dispense criminal justice. Although criminal proceedings may well establish some
sense of truth about individual wrongdoing, as Hannah Arendt
observed of the Eichmann trial, historical inquiry implies a broader lens than that of individual trials.18 This observation has particular application to the Balkans, where a truthful account would

From Communal Conflict to International Justice

If the ICTY's lack of political authority undermines its efforts to
achieve pacification through deterrence and to accomplish reconciliation through the creation of historical narratives, perhaps the
relationship of the ICTY to peace might be conceptualized along
different lines. Those who created the JCTY spoke feelingly of the
expectation that international criminal justice would establish a
form of individual accountability that would break "old cycles of
ethnic retribution" and thus advance ethnic "reconciliation." They
propounded a traditional account of liberal legalism, in which the
punishment of the law would hold individuals responsible so as to

limit and displace private vengeance." This was a central justification advanced for prosecuting atrocities associated with the
conflict. "Absolving nations of collective guilt through the attribution of individual responsibility is an essential means of countering the misinformation and indoctrination which breeds ethnic

and religious hatred. '?0
In the eyes of the international community, the conflict in the
Balkans became defined by its "ethnic cleansing." Responding to
ethnic persecution became the crux of the project of international criminal justice. The ICTY reaffirmed Nuremberg's central
principle that responsibility for war crimes should be borne by
individuals, and it sought to highlight individual responsibility for
ethnic persecutions. It chose to prosecute ethnic cleansing- the

require working through the region's history of complex and con-

purposeful policy by one group to purge by terror the civilian
population of another ethnic group from defined geographic areas
aS a series of "crimes against humanity," as "inhumane acts" disCrete but nevertheless "widespread and systematic," "perpetrated

flictual politics.
Conversely, by conflating the production of historical narratives with criminal processes, fundamental norms of due process

on any civilian population, on an ethnic basis."
At The Hague, for the first time since the trials of World War
II, ethnic persecution would also be prosecuted as "genocide." By

21
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the spring of 1992, the Final Report of the Commission of Experts
had concluded that mass murder, torture, and rape committed in
the area of Opstina Prijedor in northwestern Bosnia against civilians both in and out of detention camps unquestionably constituted crimes against humanity and that a court of law would find

it to be genocide.?? The distinctive patterns of Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing, massacres, and systematic rapes displayed a genocidal intent to destroy ethnic and religious groups. The ICTY found
that "the Muslim population of the enclave of Srebrenica [previously designated a U.N. "safe area"] virtually was eliminated by
Bosnian Serb Military personnel ... under the command and control of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic," so that there was
prima facie evidence that the facts "disclose above all, the commission of genocide."
The ICTY actually expands the scope of international criminal
jurisdiction. Whereas the Nuremberg tribunal's jurisdiction over

atrocities was ultimately tied to the conduct of an unjust war,®
the jurisdiction of the ICTY was extended to crimes against
humanity committed in the course of an armed conflict, whether
or not international. Ethnic persecution is prosecuted as an

"international" offense even if it occurs wholly within a state.
This represents a major expansion of traditional international
justice, from wrongs committed by foreign occupiers to wrongs
committed by states against their own citizens. Underlying the
expansion is the notion that victims of ethnic persecution, even
if citizens, are rendered "aliens" and pariahs within their own
homeland. They are protected by neither state nor law. International criminal justice is for them. State persecution of its citizens
will never again rest immune within national boundaries, but will
potentially be accountable to the international community.
The creators of the ICTY hoped that this vision of international law and accountability would create the foundation of a
lasting peace in the Balkans. The vision evokes the twinned ideas
of individual responsibility and the rule of law, yet it fails to fully
capture the nature and political purpose of the violence in the
region.
The concept of individual responsibility that emerges from
the ICTY is complex and merits close attention. Historically,
postwar trials have posited limits to state sovereignty, but they
have not displaced it. The ICTY, however, stands entirely apart

from national institutions, and it seeks to enforce a strange deracinated form of individual accountability that is answerable to a
global order. In its landmark decision affirming jurisdiction under
the U.N. Charter, the tribunal justified its dominion over the
crimes at issue by asserting that they "cannot be considered political offenses, as they do not harm a political interest of a particular state," and that the "norms prohibiting them have a universal

character.' In this way the tribunal figured ethnic persecution as a

profound and apolitical offense against the entire international
community, indeed, against humanity itself. The ICTY embraces a
project of transformative justice that will enforce these universal
human norms.

But prosecuting ethnic persecution this way-- stripped of its
political context and purpose poses a real challenge. For this use

of law seemed perhaps unwittingly only to support the notion
that the conflict in the Balkans is a story of ancient and intractable ethnic enmity.'? Pursuant to this characterization of the violence in the region, popular in media representations as well as in
the diplomatic community, contemporary atrocities in the Balkans
are only the latest round of a violence portrayed as inevitable and
natural to the region. Insofar as the ICTY merely counterposes a
portrait of ahistorical atrocities, committed by atomized individuals within a political vacuum, it risks confirming the notion that
these atrocities were inevitable, a fate foretold. But this representation undermines the project of individual accountability and
even appears to justify international neglect.
The tribunal risks using the law to construct a lesson about
eternal atrocities without victors or heroes. The abstract tales

'
of individualized horror produced by the ICTY may efface ques
tions about political responsibility - both national and interna-

tional responsibility -for the crimes perpetuated in the Balkans.
A more historical and political understanding of atrocities in
the region would question the role of the United Nations and
the international community at the time when the atrocities
were being committed. It was the United Nations that created
the "safe areas" that drew Muslims and Croats into the concentrated enclaves for protection. It was the passivity of the United
Nations and of the international community that allowed the

massacres. After Nuremberg, international criminal responsibility
extends even to acts of omission by those with political authority.
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Arguably, the United Nations had such authority over its "safe"
areas.
The United Nations and the entire international community
thus have deep self-regarding interests in constructing a narrative
of the massacres that stresses individual responsibility rather than
policy and political will. So it is that the absence from the courtroom of defendants who were leaders and policy makers, and
especially the continued apparent disinterest among NATO allies
in their arrest, serves to affirm a craven international neutrality.
The very neutrality thought to render the proceedings at The
Hague superior to past war crimes trials, and impervious to
charges of "victors' justice," can itself be seen to raise grave issues
of international moral responsibility and, by association, of the
tribunal's own authority.
The challenge of "tu quoque," of "unclean hands," was also
leveled at Nuremberg, loudly with respect to the Soviet judges;
but the bold new jurisdictional initiatives of the ICTY paradoxically make this challenge particularly apt to the proceedings in
The Hague. There is considerable tension in the attempt to condemn atrocities in the Balkans as international injustice and yet
simultaneously to seek to cabin ICTY indictments so as not also
to inculpate the international community that allowed the atrocities to be perpetuated. Precisely to the extent that the ICTY
seeks to internationalize "crimes against humanity," to subject
them to universal jurisdiction, those who claim power after the
fact to punish such crimes become potentially implicated in the
crimes themselves. For there is a sense in which there are victims
here of a broader international injustice. The ICTY claims that
ethnic persecution and genocide give rise to a universal jurisdiction that transcends national borders. And why, we may ask,
should international responsibility to respond to persecution be
triggered only after the massacres?
The concept of individual responsibility advanced by the ICTY
also bears a complex relationship to the question of identity at
play in the Balkans. Indeed, the very offenses prosecuted by the
ICTY - "genocide" and "crimes against humanity" embody a
highly nuanced relationship between individual and group identity. Both offenses connect individuals to group identities through
the element of motive; i.e., through the persecutory policy.26 The
offense of persecution implies at the very least a motive against a
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backdrop of state action,and often the offense is accomplished
in part through mechanisms of state policy. This means that

responsibility is best conceptualized in ways that bridge and connect individuals and collectivities.
More fundamentally, however, the offenses spring from the
supposed understanding that what has transpired involves terrible
ethnic persecution, so that the project of ascribing individual
responsibility must somehow be reconciled with these contemporary constructions of ethnic identity. The strain of this reconciliation is apparent in the prosecution's strategy, which is
affirmatively ethnoconscious in order to achieve its conciliatory
purpose of diffusing ethnic tension in the region. The ICTY takes
note of ethnicity ostensibly in order to transcend it.
The tribunal's transformative mandate is to express the message that individuals bear responsibility for persecution. The idea
is therefore to construct a plausible account of persecution in the
region,28 and this has been thought to require an "exemplary
cases" strategy.?" Thus the ICTY has attempted to prosecute
atrocities selected to include a representative sample of those
committed against Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. Defendants are

also expected to be ethnically representative. Victims, even par
ticipating jurists, are identified by their ethnic origin.'
Gender also plays a complex role in ethnic cleansing. Most of
those massacred were men; while the mass rapes were largely
perpetrated against women. Although not separate charges at
Nuremberg, sex crimes, such as rape, are at The Hague prose-

cutable as crimes against humanity.? In the Balkans, mass rape

and forced pregnancies were tools of destruction and genocide
lying at the interface of sex and ethnic persecution.

The strategy of prosecuting "exemplary cases" also has impor

tant implications for the ICTY's construction of the intersection
between individual responsibility and corporate accountability.
The strategy is cvident in the indictments issued so far, rang8
from those leveled against Karadzic and Mladic for genocide an
crimes against humanity, to those issued against Bosnian Serb and
Croat officials and civilians for atrocities committed in the camps.
The ICTY's aim has apparently been to prosecute perpetrators at
all levels of the power echelon- from the architects of the persecution policy to its lowest level agents, as well as to reach both the

military and civilian sectors of society.
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The strategy of exemplary prosecutions appears to make practical sense, so much so that it is easy to miss just how deeply it
challenges core principles of the rule of law. Fundamental to the
rule of law is the notion that the law applies with equal force and
obligation to all. Thus the Nuremberg trials were merely the first

of thousands of subsequent prosecutions. By contrast, the highly
selective prosecutions of the ICTY seem to circumscribe the very
rule of law that they are designed to instantiate. The policy of
selective prosecutions thus underscores the elusive quality of the
transformative project of the ICTY, a project that gestures toward
a liberal rule of law which the project can bring itself at most
merely to symbolize.
Symbols, however, have their uses. Created pursuant to international peace accords, the tribunal's mandate was ambitious,
and, in the context of the ongoing commission of brutal atrocities
in the region, nothing short of messianic. The Hague was assigned
the mission of transforming the course of the conflicts in the
region so as to lead to conciliation. In this context, the image of
the rule of law, shimmering at the horizon, serves unambiguously

positive purposes.
The Balkans have long brooded over an ever-present sense of
terrible injustice. Although it is often thought that a primary
function of human rights law is to expose and condemn heinous
wrongs, such an apprehension of injustice already permeates the

should be exposed for what it is- political construction. Ethnicity politics has no place in the liberal state. What needs construction is the liberal response to injustice.
Because the ICTY cannot itself fully embody the rule of law,
it must represent the rule of law in a transitional form, as an
image of the possibility of liberal justice. But what is the point of
such an image? As a practical matter, the tribunal's proceedings
are located at a venue that is so remote and insulated from the
Balkans that it is difficult to relate its trials and indictments to
the actual conflict on the ground. In the international proceedings of the JCTY, defendants and victims are frequently absent,
particularly women in the rape cases. For this reason, trials at
The Hague commonly lack confrontation, an integral element
of the catharsis and healing ordinarily offered by the criminal
process. More fundamentally, the ICTY is foreign to Bosnia,
so that its legal pronouncements, its enactment of the forms
of liberal legalism, do not carry sufficient local political authority

or weight.
These limitations serve to underscore the salient conditions
and circumstances of meaningful reconciliation. Although international criminal justice offers some degree of individual ac-

countability and hence affirms the liberal response to wrongdoing,
it lacks the supportive national structures that are necessary for
the true realization of reconciliation and the rule of law. And

Balkans.° False allegations of preemptive genocide perversely

these limitations are also apparent at the level-of the individual,

appear to have sparked the most recent wave of horror. But a full
understanding of the political causes of the ongoing injustice and
its future direction remain elusive.

for the risk of such justice is that persons may come to identify
with the role of perpetrator or victim, rather than with that of

The ICTY symbolizes the possibility of change in the region. It
offers the potential of moving from persecutory violence to the
rule of law. Within the rule of law, past wrongs cannot serve to
justify the ongoing perpetration of massacres and atrocities. By
seeking to forestall revenge, the tribunal reaffirms its purpose as
forward-looking rather than backward-looking. Its aims are less
to offer retributive justice for past wrongs than to prepare the
region for the perception of equal protection under the law. Yet,
this message can only be limited and partial- when justice does
not clarify the particular politics that derogate from the rule of
law in the region. For there to be meaningful change in societies
driven by racial, ethnic, and religious conflict, "identity politics"
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citizen.

The proceedings in The Hague fall short because they cannot
offer the thick form of reconciliation necessary for reconstructing
a community inhabited by citizens. But the foreign status and
international authority of the JCTY does offer one singular advantage. By intervening unambiguously from outside the region,
the I CTY operates beyond the political circumstances that trap
participants within the Balkans. Although the ICTY can offer to
substitute for this context only a thin and procedural symbol of
the rule of law, it is nevertheless a symbol full of potential. As

a symbol, the tribunal points to a conceivable future. It thus
represents a form of justice that is distinctly associated with
transitional periods,© it offers an instance of transitional justice
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associated with extraordinary political circumstances- when the
full rule of law is unavailable. In such transitional circumstances,
perhaps the best that can be brought into view is the image, rather
than the reality, of the liberal state.

the new Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution which provides: "All competent
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall cooperate with and provide unrestricted access to...the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia." The
:
:
l
id
h
4»
constitution
also
provides
that
states¢ commit

ic .0 fill
complying with orders
'ul'y

issued pursuant to Art. 29 of the statute of the Tribunal." The statute contemplates cooperation with the tribunal in investigation and prosecution, which
NOTES

would include tribunal orders concerning the production of evidence or the sur-

This essay's title is inspired by an essay by the late Robert M. Cover of a similar

rendering of those accused.
11. See Jacques Dumas, Les Sanctions penales des crimes ollemancls (Paris:

title in "Religion, Morality, and- the Law," Nomos 30 (eds. J. Roland Pennock,
John W. Chapman, 1988). Portions of this essay were first delivered as a talk
sponsored by the Orville Schell International Human Rights Center, Yale Law

Librairie Arthur Rousseau, 1916).
12. See Declaration of German Atrocities, Nov. I, 1943, 3 Bevans 816, 834,

School (Oct. 19, 1995). A prior shorter version of this essay was published in the

Dep't St. Bull., Nov. 6, 1943, at 310-11.

East European Constitutional Review 5.4 (Fall 1996).

13. See Address of Antonio Cassesse, President of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Nov.

1. United Nations, Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 on Establishing An International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution of

7, 1995, p. 4.
14. United Nations, International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution of

Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the

Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
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